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Abstract
We consider a tax competition game between asymmetrically un-informed
governments. Two governments simultaneously propose tax arrangements to
attract a multinational ﬁrm (MNF) which has an ex-ante preference to oper-
ate in both countries, and governments anticipate that once the MNF accepts
their oﬀer, each host will know the marginal cost of local production, but
not the marginal cost in the other country. We show that when the multina-
tional prefers to operate in both countries or not operate at all, then the tax
competition game features two equilibria. In one equilibrium, eﬃcient MNFs
are attracted in the two countries, while in the other equilibrium, ineﬃcient
MNFs are attracted. The equilibrium in which only eﬃcient ﬁrms are at-
tracted may occur as the unique outcome if the MNFs can ultimately decide
to settle in one country only. Our results suggest that, the existence of (small)
countries who are aggressive in attracting MNFs by oﬀering substantial tax
advantages allows competing governments to keep ineﬃcient ﬁrms away from
their territories.
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11 Introduction
Within the last years, tax competition has received a lot of attention by politicians,
especially in the EU. For whom pays attention to medias, the concept of tax “race
to the bottom”, which portrays the phenomenon by which tax rates (and hence
public good provision) converge to very low levels because of competition for foreign
investment1, is certainly not new. Within the tax competition literature (see Wilson,
1999 for a survey), it is usually assumed that governments are solely interested in
attracting capital. In other words, what type of capital they attract is irrelevant.
However, if ﬁrms are diﬀerentiated on the basis of their eﬃciency, it should make a
diﬀerence for a country depending on wether its tax policy attracts the most eﬃcient
or the most ineﬃcient ﬁrms.
This paper shows that when governments compete in taxes to attract ﬁrms,
then two equilibria may emerge: either the most eﬃcient ﬁrms are attracted, or the
most ineﬃcient ﬁrms are attracted. However, if one of the two governments is more
aggressive than the other, in that it is willing to provide a lot more advantages to the
ﬁrm, then the “eﬃcient” equilibrium may be sustained as the unique equilibrium.
Our model borrows from the recent trend that uses common agency as a tool
to describe the relation between MNFs and governments (see the last paragraph for
more). However, a main diﬀerence with the existing literature is that the MNF’s
information set which is bi-dimensional in our paper, and the fact that governments
are asymmetrically informed. These two diﬀerences are to capture the following
facts: if an MNF is to operate in two countries, there are country speciﬁc parameters
aﬀecting local proﬁt, which the local government may know better than the other
government. We therefore assume that the MNF’s subsidiaries in the two countries
have diﬀerent cost-eﬃciency parameters and that each government while knowing
the cost eﬃciency of the subsidiary in its country, ignores the cost-eﬃciency of the
subsidiary in the other country.
The ﬁrms that we consider are multinational ﬁrms in the sense that they prefer
to operate in both countries. However, we shall analyze two situations. In the ﬁrst
case, the multinational’s operations are worth pursing only if they are carried on
in both countries. This means that either the MNF settle in both countries, or it
settles in none of the two countries. This type of common agency model is known
as intrinsic common agency2. Under the second scenario, the MNF prefers to settle
in both countries, but may accept to settle in one country only if by doing so, it
gets a higher (global) after tax proﬁt than it would get by being active in both
countries. This is the so called delegated common agency model. These two scenari
1See Zodrow and Mieszkowsky (1986) and Wilson (1986).
2Bernheim and Winston coined this expression
2may arise, depending on the project or product of the MNF. For instance the ﬁrst
one (settle in both or none) is more likely when there exists strong spillovers, or
cost complementarities between the operations in the two countries, while the latter
scenario is more likely when these spillovers are low.
The governments compete in non-linear taxes. On a theoretical ground, this is
due to the fact that the MNF has private information. On a practical level, although
corporate taxes are usually proportional, other tax advantages that are oﬀered, espe-
cially by those countries which are aggressive in attracting capital, render corporate
taxes non-linear. Knowing that the MNF prefers to be active in both countries, each
government has to ensure that the MNF gets at lest its outside opportunity when
the MNF operates in both countries. In particular, none of the two governments will
try to ensure that the MNF operates in its country only. Such an attempt may be
interpreted as an harmful tax practice3. Therefore, even in the case of low spillovers
in which an MNF may choose only one country in equilibrium, we assume that gov-
ernments will nevertheless choose to ensure that the ﬁrm is better oﬀ when picking
both countries, than trying to ensure that the MNF picks their country exclusively.
We ﬁnd that in the case where the ﬁrm settles in both countries or none, there
exists two equilibria with the following features. In one equilibrium, the tax oﬀered
by the two governments are such that the MNF’s surplus is decreasing in its cost
eﬃciency. This means that MNFs with the lowest marginal cost of production
in both countries receives the highest after-tax proﬁt, while those with the highest
marginal cost get a zero after-tax proﬁt. With such taxes, both governments are sure
that tax competition will attract the most eﬃcient MNFs. The other equilibrium has
reversed features: tax competition attracts the most ineﬃcient ﬁrms. The features
of this latter equilibrium are unusual in standard adverse selection models, where
typically, the most ineﬃcient ﬁrm would get zero surplus.
Our paper follows the trend of incentive regulation of multinational ﬁrms that
uses the common agency approach; see Bond and Gresik (1997, 1998), Olsen and
Osmundsen (2002), Calzolari (2001, 2004). It is also related to the common agency
literature in general. However, it is most closely related to Ivaldi and Martimort
(1994), Bond and Gresik (1997, 1998), and Diaw and Pouyet (2004a) in that these
papers either consider a bi-dimensional information set for the agent (as in Ivaldi-
Martimort, 1994), or asymmetrically informed/uninformed principals (Bond and
Gresik, 1997, 1998). Diaw and Pouyet (2004a) are the ﬁrst to considers simul-
taneously bi-dimensional information set and asymmetrically informed/uninformed
principals, but they analyze oligopoly competition with substitute products and ob-
tain diﬀerent equilibria than those obtained here. Ivaldi and Martimort analyze
3In a recent report for the European Commission, a group lead by the British Paymaster General
Dawn Primarolo established a list of harmful tax practices in the EU.
3competition in non-linear pricing (with data from the French energy sector). They
have a bi-dimensional adverse selection model which ultimately boils down to a uni-
dimensional screening problem after ﬁnding a suﬃcient statistic for the information
(symmetrically) unknown to both governments. Bond and Gresik (1997) analyze an
(intrinsic) common agency model with unidimensional information, but assume that
one of the two principals is perfectly informed about the agent’s private character-
istic. However, they restrict attention to games in which (i) principals compete in
linear transfers (lump-sum plus piece rate), and more importantly, (ii) neither prin-
cipal attempts to elicit information from the agent, which introduces an important
diﬀerence with our paper. Bond and Gresik (1998) consider the same model as in
(1997) but with two-type adverse selection and principals trying to elicit informa-
tion from the agent. The endogeneity problem also arises in their model. However,
in our paper, when a principal has a preference over a low type agent, so does the
other principal, while in their paper, it may only occur to the uninformed principal.
Hence our results can in a sense be viewed as a “generalization” of their results
to the case of two (asymmetrically) uninformed principals competing in non-linear
transfers4.
2 The Model
We consider a multinational ﬁrm (the agent) which can operate in two countries.
When producing quantity q1 and q2 in countries 1 and 2 respectively, the MNF
incurs a total cost of production equal to









∂θi∂qi ≥ 0. However, the common
cost C(.,.) creates a link between the production decisions, which are considered to
be complements (as in Bond and Gresik, 97, 98), hence (
∂2CT
∂qi∂qj ≤ 0). The adverse
selection parameters are independently distributed, and it is common knowledge
that θi is distributed on Θi ≡ [θi,θi] according to the density fi(.) with cumulative
distribution Fi(.). We assume that Pi (or equivalently government i, or Principal
i) is informed about θi, but remains uninformed on θj. Therefore, principals are
asymmetrically informed, and uninformed.
4This is taken in a loose sense since they use a two-type model, while we use a continuous type
model. However, except for that diﬀerence, our model is more general, as we have two (asymmet-
rically) uninformed principals and non-linear transfers, instead of one uninformed principal and
linear transfers in their paper.
4In country i, the MNF sells its production in the local market, getting Rev-
enue R(qi). In exchange for doing business in Pi’s country, the MNF must pay a
(non-linear) tax Ti(qi) contingent on local production. In particular, to avoid being
classiﬁed as harmful practice, a ﬁrm’s tax oﬀer to the MNF cannot be contingent
on other subsidiaries’s production. 5 The MNF’s after tax proﬁt is therefore
π(θ,qi,qj) = R1(q1) − T1(θ1,q1) + R2(q2) − T2(θ2,qj) − CT(θ,q1,q2),
where θ ≡ (θi,θj). To save on notation, let Let ti(qi) ≡ Ri(qi) − Ti(θi,qi) denote
the revenue net of taxes. The choice of an appropriate tax for the government is
therefore equivalent to choosing how much net revenues to leave to the ﬁrm. The
ﬁrm’s proﬁt can therefore be more simply written as
π(θ,qi,qj) = t1(θ1,q1) + t2(θ2,qj) − CT(θ,q1,q2),
Each government designs it tax by maximizing the following welfare function com-
posed of consumer’s net surplus plus tax revenues6:
SWi = Si(qi) − Ri(qi) + Ti(θi,qi) = Si(qi) − ti(θi,qi).
The timing goes as follows: ﬁrst, the principals oﬀer simultaneously and non
cooperatively their tax to the MNF; second, the MNF decides to participate or not;
if it chose to participate, the MNF chooses its production level in each country, and
receives the corresponding transfers t1 and t2.
In a ﬁrst time, we consider the intrinsic common agency case (ica), i.e., either
the MNF accepts both contracts or does not produce at all. Therefore, to ensure the




π(θ,qi,qj) ≥ 0. (PCica)
In a ﬁnal section, we will consider the delegated common agency setting (dca),
in which the MNF can be active for only one principal at equilibrium. From the





i (θj) ≡ max




i (θj) is the MNF’s outside opportunity with respect to Pi if it decides to
be active only with Pj.
5On a theoretical ground, it is usual in the common agency under adverse selection literature,
to exclude the possibility for one principal to contract on the activity undertaken by the agent for
the other principal.
6Note that both principals do not value the MNF’s rent. Laﬀont and Pouyet (2002) and Olsen
and Osmundsen (2001) study the role such valuations in common agency models.
5Full cooperation between governments
If both governments decide to fully cooperate by exchanging their information,
then they will both be under full information since each government knows a ‘piece
of the puzzle’. Once fully informed, it is a simple exercise to show that wether the
two governments set their taxes non cooperatively, or whether they maximize joint














However, a usual feature of the intrinsic common agency setting is that only the sum
of the transfers provided to the MNF is deﬁned at equilibrium. In this setting, the
(non) cooperative aspect of the game will likely aﬀect the rent sharing between the
two governments. By contrast, in the delegated common agency setting, if one of
the outside opportunities is strictly positive, then each transfer is uniquely deﬁned
(both under complete and incomplete information).
It is clear that, given the generality of our model, it can apply to other settings
than tax competition between governments. Therefore, we interchangeably use the
terms government and principal.
3 Information Revelation
3.1 The ﬁrst-order approach in a diﬀerentiable equilibrium
Consider that principals oﬀer the MNF twice diﬀerentiable deterministic transfers.
For a given contract oﬀered to the MNF by Pj, there is no loss of generality in
using the Revelation Principle8 to ﬁnd Pi’s best-response. However, diﬀerent con-
tracts oﬀered by Pj aﬀect diﬀerently the MNF’s incentive to behave with respect
to Pi. To account for this eﬀect, Martimort and Stole (1998) propose the following
methodology (called the ‘ﬁrst-order approach’) to compute the best-response of the
principals in a diﬀerentiable equilibrium.
First, deﬁne:
ˆ πi(θj,qi) = max
qj>0 {tj(θj,qj) − CT(θ,qi,qj)}, (3)
ˆ qj(θj,qi) = argmax
qj>0 {tj(θj,qj) − CT(θ,qi,qj)}. (4)
7This FOC of the government’s maximization program relies on the concavity of Si(qi) −
CT(θ,qi,qj) in qi for any production level qj, which we assume to hold.
8See Green and Laﬀont (1977) or Myerson (1979).
6ˆ πi(θj,qi) gives the maximal gain of the MNF with type θj for a given production
level qi when it chooses optimally the production level for Pj. ˆ qj(θj,qi) is deﬁned
through the ﬁrst-order condition9:
∂tj
∂qj
(θj, ˆ qj) −
∂CT
∂qj
(θ,qi, ˆ qj) = 0. (5)
Now, from the viewpoint of Pi, everything happens as if he were facing an MNF
with total rent given by:
π(θ) ≡ max
qi>0 {ti(θi,qi) + ˆ πi(θj,qi)}.
We can thus apply the standard methodology to ﬁnd the conditions for local incen-
tive compatibility from the viewpoint of Pi, which are given in the next lemma.
Lemma 1 A pair {π(θi,.),qi(θi,.))} is implementable by Pi if and only if, for all












(θ) ≥ 0. (SOICi)
To validate this approach, it must be the case that, at equilibrium, it is indeed a
global maximum for the MNF to accept both contracts. We shall assume that this

































Let us look at the way Pi provides the MNF with the incentive to reveal its private






(θj, ˆ qj(θj,qi(θ))) −
∂Cj
∂θj
(θj, ˆ qj(θj,qi(θ))). (6)
9Martimort and Stole (1998) show that such characterization is always possible through an
adequate extension of the equilibrium transfers (to account for possible out-of-equilibrium reports
which would generate out-of-equilibrium production levels).
7As a consequence of (6), Pi can aﬀect the MNF’s rent only in an indirect way since
the slope of the rent only depends directly on ˆ qj. In this sense, information revelation
operates only in an indirect way: by distorting the production proﬁle qi(θi,.), Pi
provides the MNF with an incentive to reallocate both production levels (since
quantities are linked through the common cost); this reallocation of production
aﬀects in turn the MNF’s rent.





Under (SM), the second-order condition for incentive compatibility reduces to a
monotonicity condition.
3.3 Limits of the analysis
As explained previously, we will need to ascertain that the diﬀerent optimality con-
ditions are satisﬁed at equilibrium. The MNF’s and the principals’ problems must
be locally but also globally concave. Similarly, the Spence-Mirrlees condition must
be satisﬁed for every equilibrium quantity proﬁles.
These conditions typically depend endogeneously on the transfers implemented
by the principals, which make them diﬃcult to check ex post, as opposed to the
one principal-one agent model. Therefore, the literature on common agency under
adverse selection has followed two paths: in asymmetric settings, postulate the ex-
istence of a diﬀerentiable equilibrium characterized by a ﬁrst-order approach (as in
Olsen and Osmundsen, 2001, or Laﬀont and Pouyet, 2002); in symmetric settings,
verify ex post those conditions by imposing more structure on the model (e.g., Mar-
timort and Stole, 1998, show that with a quadratic cost function those conditions
are satisﬁed). Notice also that the veriﬁcation of these conditions typically strongly
relies on a comparison between the quantity proﬁles under perfect cooperation be-
tween principals with the ones under non cooperation.
Given the inherent asymmetry of our model, we will mainly consider the existence
of a diﬀerentiable equilibrium as granted, implying that (SOCA) and (SM) are
assumed to be satisﬁed11
10It should also be noted that this condition is endogenous and cannot be postulated priori.
Throughout the analysis, we shall assume that this property emerges in both indirect utility func-
tions vis-` a-vis either principal.
11We are able to prove the existence of such equilibrium if we assume a quadratic cost function
and uniform distributions (see also Ivaldi and Martimort, 1994)
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which cannot be signed a priori. To ensure that the problem is well-behaved, we
assume that Sign[ ∂π
∂θj(θ)] is constant. This implies that there exists θ∗
j, with θ∗
j ∈
{θj,θj} such that if the participation constraint is satisﬁed in θj = θ∗
j, it will be
satisﬁed for all θj. Let deﬁne by ˜ θj the bound of Θj diﬀerent from θ∗
j.
The problem of Pi can be restated as follows:
max
{qi(θ),π(θ)}




∀θj ∈ Θj : (FOICi),(SOICi).
Since leaving a rent to the MNF is costly for Pi, the participation constraint will be
binding at θ∗
j: π(θi,θ∗
j) = 0. The Hamiltonian associated to Pi’s problem is:




The Maximum Principle gives ˙ µi(θj) = −∂H
∂π = fj(θj). Since there is no transversal-
ity condition in ˜ θj, we have µi(θj) =
R θj
















j (θj, ˆ qj) −
∂2CT
∂q2
j (θ,qi, ˆ qj)
∂2CT
∂qi∂qj
(θ,qi, ˆ qj). (7)
In Appendix A, we show that
∂2tj
∂θj∂qj(θj, ˆ qj) −
∂2CT
∂θj∂qj(θ,qi, ˆ qj) ≤ 0, implying that the
sign of the right-hand-side of (7) is given the sign of µi(θj) and the nature of the
interaction between activities.
At equilibrium, we will have
ˆ qj(θj,qi(θ)) = qj(θ) (8)






(θ,qi(θ),qj(θ)) = 0. (9)




































Equations (10) and (11) enable to simplify (7); proceeding to similar computations
for Pj leads to a system of partial diﬀerential equations that characterize the equi-
librium quantity proﬁles in a informative equilibrium of the common agency game
under incomplete information.
Using then the concavity of Si − CT (respectively Sj − CT) with respect to qi
(respectively qj), we are then able to analyze the equilibrium distortions with respect
to the ﬁrst-best solution.
We shall now determine θ∗
j and θ∗
i. Consider that ∂π
∂θj(θ) ≤ 0 ∀θj. Then, θ∗
j = θj,






































This implies that, from Pj’s viewpoint, the MNF’s rent is decreasing in the unknown
adverse selection parameter θi: therefore, θ∗
i = θi and µj(θi) = Fi(θi) .
Similarly, we can show that had we assumed that ∂π
∂θj(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θj (implying that
θ∗
j = θj), we would have obtained that θ∗
i = θ
∗
i; in that case, we would have obtained
that µi(θj) = −(1 − Fj(θj)) and µj(θi) = −(1 − Fi(θi)).
The next proposition summarizes these results
Proposition 1 In the tax competition game with static multinationals, two equilib-
ria emerge. The ﬁrst equilibrium features the most eﬃcient MNF (θ
,
1θ2) getting zero
after-tax proﬁts, while the most ineﬃcient MNF (θ1,θ2) gets the highest after-tax
proﬁt, and there is overproduction in both countries with respect to full cooperation.
The second equilibrium has (the standard) reversed features.
10A potentially damaging aspect of tax competition that has often been put for-
ward is the tax race to the bottom, i.e. the fact that tax revenues are pushed
downward. The above proposition points at another potential damage of tax com-
petition: attracting the most ineﬃcient ﬁrms. Indeed, if the tax policies toward
foreign investment are such that the most ineﬃcient ﬁrms make the highest proﬁt,
then they will be inevitably attracted by such policies, while eﬃcient ﬁrms may want
to stay away from these countries. However, a key aspect for the emergence of such
an unusual equilibrium is the information asymmetry not only between the MNF
and the governments, but between the government themselves. With asymmetri-
cally uninformed governments, the government’s preference over the agent’s type
becomes endogenous. This endogeneity eﬀect is present in Bond and Gresik (97,
98), and in Diaw and Pouyet (2004a). However, as we shall see next, if the synergy
between subsidiaries’s operation are small enough so that the MNF can credibly
decide to settle in one country only when the other country’s oﬀer is uninterest-
ing, then both governments may escape the dilemma of attracting capital without
attracting bad ﬁrms.
5 Eﬀect of relocation threat
We now focus on the analysis of the case in which the MNF prefers to operate in
both countries, but may decide, once governments make their oﬀers, to be active
in one country only. An alternative formulation is to assume that the MNF is
already doing operations in both countries, but can credibly threaten to move all its
operation in one country to the other country (hence the title of the section), if it is
more proﬁtable than being in both countries. This is likely to happen if the other
country oﬀers more tax advantages. Despite this threat, we analyze a game in which
none of the two governments tries deliberately to exclude the other government. In
equilibrium, the MNF settles in both countries. The eﬀect of the relocation threat is
to aﬀect the outside opportunity of the MNF in its relation with a government, such
outside option being endogenous. Hence each government faces an MNF with type-
dependant participation constraints. Before proceeding, we present the following
result, due to Calzolari and Scarpa (2001)
Lemma 2 Both outside opportunities cannot be simultaneously positive
Therefore, either both outside opportunities are negative, and the governments
have to ensure the ﬁrm at least zero proﬁt, in which case we are back to the equilibria
under static multinationals; Or, one at most of the outside opportunities is positive.
11We ﬁrst consider the relation between the MNF and principal i, and assume that
the outside opportunity of the MNF, if it accepts principal j’s oﬀer only, is positive
(by lemma 2, this implies that in the MNF’s relation with principal j, the outside
opportunity of the MNF is negative). We analyze how this possibility for the MNF





i (θj) ≡ max
qj
{tj(θj,qj) − CT(θ,qi = 0,qj)},
q
out
j (θj) ≡ argmax
qj
{tj(θj,qj) − CT(θ,qi = 0,qj)}.
We also assume that qout
















j ) = 0, (13)

































(θj, ˆ qj) −
∂CT
∂qj
(θj, ˆ qj) = 0. (16)


















12As argued in Martimort and Stole (1998), the transfer schedules must be extended (over the
real line for instance) to account for possible out-of-equilibrium report, which would generate
quantity levels outside the equilibrium intervals. Martimort (1992) shows that it is always possible
to extend the transfer schedules in a linear way.
12under (SOCA). Therefore, (φ−1)0 = 1
φ0 ≤ 0, implying that φ−1 is a decreasing
function.
As a consequence, using (15) and (16), we obtain that qout
j (θj) ≤ ˆ qj(θj,qi).






(θj, ˆ qj) =
∂tj
∂θj







































Therefore, the net rent π(θ) − πout
i (θj) is decreasing in θj.
Given that the outside opportunity is positive, this implies that if the participa-
tion constraint is satisﬁed in θ∗
j = θj, then it will be satisﬁed for all θj.
Now, let us analyze the relation between principal j and the MNF. Recall that,
by the fact that the MNF’s outside opportunity in its relation with principal i is
positive, the MNF’s outside opportunity in its relation with principal j is negative
by lemma 2. Hence it equals zero. The problem faced by principal j is therefore the
same as the one he faces in the case of a static multinational. Recall that in that
case, if the rent of the MNF with the other principal (e.g., principal i) is decreasing,
so will be the rent of the MNF with respect to principal j (see analysis right before
proposition 1). Therefore, for both principals, the participation constraints of the
ﬁrm are binding at (θ1,θ2).
Proposition 2 In the tax competition game, the following equilibria may emerge
• If both outside opportunities are negative, the equilibria are the same as in the
static case
• If one outside opportunity is positive then there exists a unique equilibrium in
which the most eﬃcient MNFs (θ1,θ2) are attracted
Technically, one cannot identify the conditions under which one government’s
outside opportunity is positive. However, intuitively, if one of the governments is
strongly committed to attract the MNF, then it will be less aggressive in the rent
extraction game between principals. Hence, the MNF’s equilibrium proﬁt with that
government, if it decides to settle only in its country, is likely to be positive. In
13Europe, for example, some big countries stick to tax policies with relatively high
tax rates (France, Germany, England), while other smaller countries oﬀer large tax
advantages to MNF (Ireland and, to a lesser extent, The Netherlands). Based on
the remark above about outside opportunities, one may conclude that the existence
of such countries oﬀering low tax rates is not so bad after all, because it may allow to
‘escape’ the equilibrium in which ineﬃcient ﬁrms are attracted. This does not mean
that the second equilibrium in proposition 2 dominates the equilibrium in which
ineﬃcient ﬁrms are attracted with a static multinational. Indeed, with a relocation
threat, one government has to oﬀer the MNF at least the value of its (positive)
outside option, on top of the informational rents, while these latters are the only
surplus collected by the static MNF.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have derived the (diﬀerentiable) equilibria of a common agency
game in which the agent has a bidimensional information set, each principal being
perfectly informed about one dimension, imperfectly informed about the other, and
asymmetrically informed between them. With complementary productions, there
exists two equilibria under the intrinsic common agency case: one in which the
principals prefer the socially ineﬃcient ﬁrm, and another with reverse feature. In
the delegated common agency, the odd equilibrium (in which the most ineﬃcient
ﬁrm gets the highest surplus) may disappear.
A Appendix


















































Finally, under (SM) and (SOCA) it must be the case that
∂qi
∂θi(θ) ≥ 0 at equi-
librium.
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